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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
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AMERICA FIRST CREDIT UNION, : 
a Utah corporation, Case No. 940483-CA 
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FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N. A. , 
Defendant and Appellant. : 
RENAISSANCE EXCHANGE, INC. and : 
DON NEWSOM, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT QF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this case is vested in this Court 
pursuant Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-3(2)(k) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1) Whether the trial court erred in finding that 
America First Credit Union's "Notice of Assignment," under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-9-318(3), reasonably notified First Security Bank 
of Utah that payment of an account was to be made to First 
Security. 
2) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to 
grant First Security Bank of Utah a credit for proceeds 
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deposited into Renaissance Exchange, Inc. ' s account with America 
First. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. The proper standard of review to be applied to 
the trial court' s legal determination that America First Credit 
Union's ("America First") notice was adequate is that of 
correctness, 1 with a broad measure of discretion given to the 
trial court' s determination that the notice of assignment 
reasonably notified First Security Bank of Utah ("First 
Security") that payment was to be made to America First. See 
State v. Pena. 869 P. 2d 932 (Utah 1994). First Security's 
recommendation that this court conduct a de novo review of the 
first issue is misguided. 2 The Utah Supreme Court in Pena 
rejected de novo review where resolution to the legal question 
is highly fact-dependent, giving the trial judge considerable 
freedom in applying a legal principal to the facts. Id. at 
937-38. The amount of discretion or the size of the "pasture"3 
Whether a proper or adequate notice is given is typically 
a question of law. New Pueblo Constructors, Inc. v. State. 144 
Ariz. 113, 696 P. 2d 203, 211 (Ct. App. 1984). 
2For support, First Security cites Kennecott Copper Corp. 
v. Salt Lake County. 799 P. 2d 1156 (Utah 1990), which sets forth 
the standard of review to an appeal from a summary judgment. 
Id. at 1158-59. 
3The Supreme Court in Pena borrows Professor Maurice 
Rosenberg' s metaphor of a pasture in describing the degrees of 
discretion accorded a trial court' s application of legal 
propositions to facts. State v. Pena. 869 P. 2d 932, 937-38 
(Utah 1994). 
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^ **-* I. Utah Code Ann. S 7QA-9-106t 
"Account" means any right to payment for 
goods sold or leased or for services 
rendered which 1B not evidenced by an 
instrument or chattel paper, whether or 
not it has been earned by performance. 
"General intangibles" means any personal 
property (including things in action) 
other than goods, accounts, chattel 
paper, documents, instruments, and 
money. All rights to payment earned or 
unearned under a charter or other 
contract involving the use or hire of a 
vessel and all rights incident to the 
charter or contract are accounts. 
XX. Utah Code Ann. S 70A-9-203(U: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of 
Section 70A-4-208 on the security 
interest of a collecting bank. Section 
70A-8-321 on security interests in 
securities, and Section 70A-9-113 on a 
security interest arising under the 
chapter on sales, a security interest is 
not enforceable against the debtor or 
third parties with respect to the 
collateral and does not attach unless: 
(a) the collateral is in the 
possession of the secured party 
pursuant to agreement, or the 
debtor has signed a security 
agreement which contains a 
description of the collateral and 
in addition, when the security 
interest covers crops growing when 
the security interest covers crops 
growing or to be grown or timber to 
be cut, a description of the land 
concerned; 
(b) value has been given; and 
(c) the debtor has rights in 
the collateral. 
III. Utah Code Ann. 5 70A-9-3i8(3): 
(3) The account debtor is 
authorized to pay the assignor until the 
account debtor receives notification 
that the amount due or to become due has 
been assigned and that payment is to be 
made to the assignee. A notification 
which does not reasonably identify the 
rights assignee is ineffective. If 
requested by tne account debtor, the 
assignee must seasonably furnish 
reasonable proof that the assignment has 
been made and unless he does so the 
account debtor may pay the assignor. 
expands where the facts applied to the legal rule or standard 
are varying or complex and where the trial judge has observed 
"facts," such as a witnesses demeanor, that cannot be adequately 
reflected in the record. IsL at 938-39. 
The parties agree that the adequacy of the notice 
under section 70A-9-318(3) depends upon whether the notice was 
reasonable. 4 First Security does not dispute the trial court' s 
legal conclusion that "reasonableness" is the touchstone of the 
section 9-318(3) notice requirements. The trial court 
specifically stated: 
With respect to the second notice 
requirement, under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-
318(3), there is no particular language 
required in directing payment to the 
assignee. The appropriate test is whether 
the notice was reasonable under the 
particular facts in the case. Moab Nat'1 
Bank v. Kevstone-Wallace Resources, 30 Utah 
2d 330, 517 P. 2d 1020 (1973). 
(See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 14, 11 13, 
attached hereto as Addendum No. 1) (emphasis added). The 
parties, the trial court, and the authorities are in concert: 
whether "reasonable notice" was given is the relevant query in 
determining whether there was adequate notice under section 9-
318(3). 
4First Security frames the first issue as to whether "the 
trial court err[ed] in concluding that the Credit Union' s 
'Notice of Assignment' reasonably notified First 
Security . . . ." (See Appellant's Brief, p. 1) (emphasis 
added). 
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As shown in the Argument of this brief, the issue of 
whether reasonable notice was given is highly fact-dependent. 
£££, e. a. , Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation of Pres. of Church 
Of Jegyg Chrigt pf Lflttsr-flgty gfrintB, 534 P. 2d 887 (Utah 1975); 
Moab Nat'1 Bank v. Kevstone-Wallace Resources. 30 Utah 2d 330, 
517 P. 2d 1020 (1973). Courts uniformly hold that the 
reasonableness of the notice under section 9-318(3) is a factual 
question and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. See, 
e. g. , Municipal Trust and Sav. Bank v. Grant Park Community 
Dist. Number 6, 171 111. App. 289, 121 111. Dec. 449, 525 N. E. 
2d 235 (1988) (what is reasonable notice under section 9-318(3) 
must be determined by the particular facts of each case); Hall 
Bros. Constr. Co., Inc. v. Mercantile Nat'1 Bank of Indiana. No. 
45A05-9401-CV-14, 1994 WL 615303, at *5 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 
1994) (section 9-318(3) does not prescribe any "magic words;" 
the sufficiency of a notice depends upon the facts of each 
case). Given the significance of and the variance of fact 
patterns in each case, courts understandably are loath to 
require "magic words" or particular language for notices under 
section 9-318(3). 
Underscoring the need in this case to accord the trial 
court discretion is that the trial court observed the demeanor 
of the witnesses, judged their credibility, and, on the basis of 
its observations, made specific factual determinations relevant 
to notice. 
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The difference in the standards of review advocated by 
the parties mirrors the fundamental difference between the 
parties in their evidentiary approach to this case on both the 
trial and appeal levels. First Security' s approach is 
legalistic, hypertechnical and sterile; it requests the court to 
focus on the exact language the bank insists is required to 
effectuate reasonable notice in every assignment, regardless of 
the circumstances. America First' s approach is factual, 
realistic and policy-oriented; it requests the courts to focus 
on the particular facts and circumstances in each case. 
II. First Security correctly states the standard of 
review for the second issue: a correction of error standard for 
assessing the proper theory for measuring damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
America First sued First Security after First Security 
wrongfully paid out the proceeds of a certified deposit account 
to Renaissance Exchange, Inc. ("Renaissance"), a Georgia 
Corporation doing business in Weber County, Utah. Renaissance 
had assigned the account to America First as collateral security 
for a loan, and America First notified First Security in writing 
of the assignment. First Security recognized the assignment and 
acknowledged that payment was to be made to America First, not 
Renaissance. First Security issued a savings certificate to 
America First that was payable upon presentation. First 
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Security later paid the proceeds to Renaissance upon demand. 
Renaissance then defaulted on its loan with America First-
America First presented its savings certificate to First 
Security and demanded payment of the account proceeds, but First 
Security refused to make payment as promised. 5 
II. Course of Proceedings 
America First brought an action against First Security 
to enforce its rights in the proceeds. First Security filed a 
third-party claim against Renaissance and Don Newsom, president 
and sole shareholder of Renaissance, for the entire amount 
sought from First Security by America First. In a separate 
action, America First sued both Newsom and Renaissance for the 
deficiency on the loan. The two actions, including First 
Security' s third-party action, were consolidated. 
The consolidated action was tried in a bench trial on 
November 8-9 and December 10, 1993. The trial court took the 
case under advisement, and on February 24, 1994, the trial court 
entered a judgment for America First against First Security for 
the full amount of the account proceeds ($99,999.00); judgment 
for America First against Don Newsom and Renaissance for the 
5A principal issue addressed at trial that is not at issue 
in this appeal was whether America First had an enforceable 
security interest in the savings certificate. The trial court 
determined that the future advances clause contained in the 
security agreement between America First and First Security is 
enforceable, the parties actually intending the certificate of 
deposit to secure the later loan, thus giving the credit union 
an enforceable security interest in the security certificate. 
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full amount of the loan deficiency ($551,529.11, less the amount 
paid by First Security to America First in accordance with the 
judgment); and judgment for First Security against Don Newsom 
and Renaissance for the account proceeds ($99,999.00). The 
trial court later entered its findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. First Security now appeals the judgment for America 
First against First Security. 
III. Statement of Facts 
Between April of 1988 and May of 1990, America First, 
Renaissance and Don R. Newsom entered into three loan 
transactions. (Record at 337. ) Renaissance contracted with the 
United States Government to operate food facilities in thirteen 
states.6 (R. at 336, 737. ) The purpose of each of the three 
loans was essentially the same for each loan: to establish or 
renew a line of credit to provide Renaissance with working 
capital to purchase government food-service contracts and to pay 
off its debts with other financial institutions, including the 
Bank of Utah and Valley Bank. (R. at 337-40; 407. ) As part of 
the first loan transaction, Renaissance executed a commercial 
security agreement in favor of America First, granting the 
credit union a security interest in a certificate of deposit, 
6At one point, Renaissance employed nearly eight hundred 
employees. Don R. Newsom was the president and sole shareholder 
of Renaissance. Renaissance is no longer doing business. (R. 
at 336; 735-36. ) 
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No. 984993, held at First Security, in the amount of $99, 999, 00, 
(R. at 338. ) 
America First then took actual possession of the 
certificate of deposit. The certificate of deposit stated on 
its face that it is "payable at the issuing office to the 
registered owner(s) upon presentation to surrender the 
certificate properly endorsed. . . . " America First officials 
believed that First Security would pay the proceeds from the 
certificate of deposit only upon presentation, as stated on the 
face of the certificate. (R. at 340; 437-38; 446-47. ) Indeed, 
it was First Security' s policy that it would pay the proceeds 
from the certificate of deposit only upon presentation, as 
stated upon the certificate. (R. at 720-21.) First Security 
later changed its internal policy so that the registered owner 
of a certificate of deposit, despite what the plain language on 
the certificate states, needs not present and surrender the 
certificate to get their money out. First Security did not 
notify America First of this change in policy. (R. at 340, 619, 
718. ) 
America First then notified First Security in writing 
that it was holding the certificate as collateral. Don Newsom 
signed the written notice of assignment as president of 
Renaissance, acknowledging that Renaissance assigned the 
certificate to America First. An officer of First Security 
signed the Assignment to confirm the balance of the certificate 
910X7844.1 
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and to promise that America First' s security interest would be 
in effect until First Security received written notice from 
America First that the security interest was released. The 
written notice of assignment stated as follows: 
ASSIGNMENT QF $AVIN(?$ CERTIFICATE 
We are holding as collateral on a Line of 
Credit Savings Certificate No. 984993 in the 
Amount of $99,999.00, in the name of 
Renaissance Exchange. Renaissance Exchange, 
Inc. is willing to pledge this certificate 
as collateral on their loan with America 
First Credit Union. 
Renaissance Exchange, Inc. 
By: fDon R. Newsom. Pres. 
Title 
America First Credit Union is holding the 
original certificate as collateral. We 
would appreciate your acknowledgement of the 
Assignment, also confirming the balance of 
$99,999.00. This Assignment will be in 
effect until vou have received written 
notice of our release of the Assignment. 
Please acknowledge the Assignment and the 
balance by signing below. One copy should 
be retained in your files. 
First Security Bank of Utah 
By: fDonald B. Hansen 
Asst. Vice Pres. Title 
(emphasis added). (R. at 341-42; Addendum "1".) 
First Security then recognized the assignment and the 
notice that payment should be made to America First, not 
Renaissance, and flagged on its computer system the assignment 
for the certificate of deposit. The information on the computer 
screen was designed to alert First Security employees of the 
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assignment and the credit union' s right to payment. When the 
certificate of deposit was rolled over into a new certificate, 
bearing the number 985011, First Security again properly coded 
into its computer system the assignment for certificate 985011. 
(R. at 342; 657-61. ) 
After the second loan was transacted, America First 
gave First Security a second written assignment identical to the 
first assignment. Because the savings certificate had been 
rolled over into a subsequent certificate, a First Security Bank 
official crossed out No. 984993 on the face of the assignment 
and handwrote in pen, No. 985011. Don R. Newsom again signed 
the second assignment as president of Renaissance, acknowledging 
that Renaissance assigned the certificate to America First. An 
officer of First Security again signed the assignment, making 
the same confirmation and acknowledgements as in the first 
assignment. First Security never demanded from America First 
more proof or information of either written assignment. (R. at 
342-43; addendum "2". ) 
When the certificate of deposit was rolled over the 
third time into a new certificate, First Security inadvertently 
failed to flag on its computer system the assignment to America 
First, which would have alerted bank employees of the assignment 
and of the credit union' s right to payment. First Security did 
not inform or notify America First that it removed the computer 
block flagging the assignment, nor did the bank inform or notify 
910X7844 1 
11/15/94 10 
America First that when it rolled the certificate over the third 
time that it had replaced the certificate with a day-time 
deposit receipt. (R. at 343; 661-64. ) 
On two different occasions, once when the savings 
certificate matured in September of 1989 and when the day-time 
deposit matured later in March of 1990, Renaissance withdrew 
from the account the interest that had accrued, but left the 
principal of $99, 999. 00. (R. at 344. ) 
In May of 1990, Newsom represented to First Security 
that America First had released its interest in the savings 
certificate and made a demand for the certificate proceeds. 
First Security then tendered the proceeds of the savings 
certificate to Renaissance and issued a check to Renaissance for 
$100,836.62, the total principal and interest in the account. 
Renaissance then deposited the proceeds from the savings 
certificate into their account with America First. (R. at 344. ) 
At the time of the deposit of the $100,836.62 into 
Renaissance' s account, America First had five contracts assigned 
to it. Renaissance' s account had additional funds, ranging from 
$20,000.00 to $40,000.00 flowing through its account from these 
contracts on a weekly basis. (R. at 448-49. ) 
Seven months after First Security tendered to 
Renaissance the proceeds from the savings certificate, 
Renaissance defaulted on its payments to America First. America 
First made a demand on First Security to pay the credit union 
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the proceeds of the certificate and offered to tender the 
certificate. First Security refused to tender the proceeds of 
the certificate and told the credit union that it had paid the 
proceeds to Renaissance. (R. at 344-45; 436-37. ) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First Security claims that the notice of assignment 
under section 70A-9-318(3) of the Utah Code did not demand 
payment to America First. First Security does not, however, 
dispute that the other notice requirements of section 70A-9-
318(3) were satisfied. 
The law is clear that notice that payment is to be 
made to the assignee (America First) is adequate if the notice 
is reasonable under the particular facts and circumstances. No 
magic words or particular language is required for effective 
notice. What constitutes reasonable notice depends upon the 
facts and circumstances on a case-by-case basis. Also highly 
relevant are the business expectations of America First and 
First Security. 
The Official Comment to the Uniform Code expressly 
state that the purpose of requiring the notice to demand payment 
to the assignee is to accommodate ordinary business practices in 
indirect collection situations. In an indirect collection 
situation, it is important that notice that payment is directed 
to the assignee be explicit. The stringency of this notice 
requirement loses steam, however, when there is not an indirect 
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collection situation. To hold otherwise is to turn a deaf ear 
to the policies underlying section 70A-9-318(3). 
In this case, America First' s notice of assignment 
reasonably demanded payment under the particular facts and 
circumstances. First Security does not dispute any of the trial 
court' s factual findings. Instead, First Security is asking 
this Court to determine that the payment notice was insufficient 
based on the notice alone. 
This case does not involve an indirect collection 
situation. Treating this case as an indirect collection 
situation makes no sense and would not further the policies and 
purposes underlying section 70A-9-318(3). The trial court found 
that First Security had actual knowledge that payment was to be 
directed to America First. Actual knowledge of a fact notice 
thereof. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(25)(b) (1990). 
The particular facts and circumstances in this case 
show that the notice was reasonable. First Security 
acknowledged and promised to comply with America First' s 
request. First Security never demanded more proof of the 
assignment. The notice was not sent independent by America 
First, and it was co-signed by Don Newsom of Renaissance. The 
reasonableness of the notice is further evidenced by the fact 
that America First had in its possession a savings certificate 
that indicated that the moneys in the certificate would not be 
released unless upon proper presentation. 
910\7844. 1 
11/15/94 13 
Under the plain language of section 70A-9-318(3), it 
is immaterial that America First' s rights to the collateral 
ripen only upon default of Renaissance, Subsection (3) 
expressly applies to situations where the account debtor 
receives notification that the amount due or to become due has 
been assigned. 
Finally, the trial court did not err in refusing to 
credit First Security for proceeds deposited into Renaissance' s 
account with America First. The $19,096.03 directly benefitted 
Valley Bank, not America First. It is pure speculation by First 
Security that America First benefitted from the deposit and is 
not an issue worthy of remanding for further consideration. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
First Security does not dispute 
that it receive notice that the 
account had been assigned and that 
the notice reasonably identified 
the rights that had been assigned. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318 governs the rights of 
parties in Utah where an assignment of an account or some 
intangible is made. Section 70A-9-318(3) resolves certain 
predictable problems that arise upon assignment between 
"assignor," "assignee," and "account debtor," with the term 
"account debtor" defined to mean "the person who is obligated on 
an account, chattel paper or general intangible. " Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-9-105(l)(a) (1990). In this case, America First is 
910X7844.1 
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the assignee, Renaissance is the assignor, and First Security 
Bank is the account debtor. 
Section 70A-9-318(3) authorizes the account debtor 
(First Security) to pay the assignor (Renaissance) until the 
account debtor (First Security) receives notice that (1) the 
amount due or to become due has been assigned, (2) demand that 
the account debtor make payment to the assignee, and (3) 
reasonably identify the rights that have been assigned. Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3) (1990). Subsection (3) states in full: 
The account debtor [First Security Bank] 
is authorized to pay the assignor 
[Renaissance] until the account debtor 
receives notification of the amount due or 
to become due has been assigned and that 
payment is to be made to the assignee 
[credit union]. Notification which does not 
reasonably identify the rights assigned is 
ineffective. If requested by the account 
debtor, the assignee must furnish reasonable 
proof that the assignment has been made and 
unless he does so the account debtor may pay 
the assignor. 
The trial court found that the notice requirements 
were satisfied by the notice of assignment in this case. On 
appeal, First Security does not dispute that it received notice 
that the account had been assigned. Nor does First Security 
dispute that the notice reasonably identifies the rights that 
have been assigned First. Security disputes only the trial 
court' s finding that the notice reasonably demanded payment to 
America First. 
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II. 
Notice that payment is to be made 
to the assignee is adequate if 
the notice is reasonable under 
the particular facts and circumstances. 
No magic words or language are required for effective 
notice under section 70A-9-318(3). Instead, the adequacy of the 
notice hinges upon the reasonableness of the notice. What is 
reasonable depends upon the particular facts and circumstances 
of each case, including the reasonable business expectations of 
the parties. 
A. Aflequate notice under section 7QA-9-
318(3) does not require any particular 
language. 
First Security would have this court to decide the 
sufficiency of what constitutes adequate notice under section 
70A-9-318(3) in a vacuum, disregarding the particular facts and 
the underlying policies of the statute. The bottom line for 
First Security is that the assignment is unenforceable because 
the magic word "payment" does not appear on the assignment. 
First Security is flatly wrong. The Uniform Commercial Code 
does not require any particular language or "magic words" to be 
used in directing payment to the assignee. See Hall Bros. 
Constr. Co. . Inc. v. Mercantile Nat' 1 Bank of Indiana. No, 
45A05-9401-CV-14, 1994 WL 615303, at *5 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 
1994) ("Section 9-318(3) does not prescribe any 'magic words' 
for a notice of assignment."); First Nat' 1 Bank of Rio Arriba v. 
910X7844 .1
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Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. , 91 N. M. 126, 571 P. 2d 118-119 
(1977) ("The code does not require any particular language to be 
used in directing payment to the assignee."); General Motors 
Acceptance Corp. v. Albany Water Bd. , 187 AD 894, 590 N. Y. S. 2d 
312, (1992) ("No particular form of notice is required; rather, 
it is sufficient if the information known to the debtor either 
apprises the debtor of the assignment or serves to put the 
debtor on inquiry."); Gateway Nat' 1 Bank of Chicago v. Saxe, 40 
A. D. 653, 336 N. Y. S. 2d 668 (1972) (no particular form of notice 
is required by section 9-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code). 
B. The adequacy of notice under section 
70A-9-318m turns on whether the notice is 
reasonable under the particular facts and 
circumstances of each case. 
Section 70A-9-318(3) requires only that the notice 
reasonably demand payment to the assignee. Municipal Trust and 
Sav. Bank v. Grant Park Community Dist. Number 6. 171 111. App. 
289, 121 111. Dec. 449, 525 N. E. 2d 235, 258 (1988). What is 
"reasonable" is determined by the particular facts on a case-by-
case basis. Id. In Municipal Trust and Sav. Bank, an 
assignee's letter of notice under section 9-318(3) reasonably 
notified the account debtor that the assignee had acquired the 
assignor7 s rights by assignment and reasonably demanded payment 
where, despite the potential insufficiency of the notice on its 
face, the account debtor acknowledged and promised to comply 
with the assignee' s request instead of demanding further proof 
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of the assignment. IiL at 258. The court in Municipal Trust 
and Savs. Bank specifically states: 
Under the facts as alleged in this 
case, we believe that plaintiff s letter 
reasonably notified defendant that plaintiff 
had a right to assignment and reasonably 
demanded payment. We make no judgment as to 
the sufficiency of the notice standing 
alone, but base our decision on the fact 
that defendant chose to acknowledge and 
promise to comply with plaintiff s request 
instead of demanding more proof of the 
assignment. In this light, the language by 
plaintiff . . . meets the reasonableness 
test; especially when considering the notice 
was not sent independently by plaintiff, but 
was also co-signed by the assignor. 
Similarly, we have been provided no 
authority which holds that notices sent 
under section 9-318(3) require "magic words" 
to be effective. In fact, the only 
requirement is that the notice reasonably 
identify the rights of the assignee and 
reasonably demands payment to the assignee. 
What is "reasonable" must be determined by 
the particular facts of each case. 
Id. (emphasis added). See also Hall Bros. Constr. Co. . Inc. . 
No. 45A05-9401-CV-14, 1994 WL 615303, at *5 ("Whether a notice 
is sufficient depends upon the facts of each case."). 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the adequacy of a 
notice of assignment in two cases: Bank of Salt Lake v. 
Corporation pf Prgg, pf the ghyrgh pf Jegyg Chrigt Qf Lgrtter-flgiy 
Saints, 534 P. 2d 887 (Utah 1975) and Moab Nat' 1 Bank v. 
Keystone-Wallace Resources, 30 Utah 2d 330, 517 P. 2d 1020 
(1973). In both cases, the touchstone of adequate notice is 
whether the notice was reasonable under the specific facts and 
circumstances. 
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In Bank of Salt Lake, the Utah Supreme Court found 
that notice to a clerical employee could not reasonably be 
construed as notice to the church. Where the bank had no direct 
dealings with the church, and had relied completely on what the 
assignor said and did, it had not taken "such steps as could be 
reasonably required to inform the Church of these assignments. " 
Bank of Salt Lake. 534 P. 2d at 891. 
In Moab Nat' 1 Bank, the Utah Supreme Court sustained 
the trial court' s finding that Keystone-Wallace Resources 
received reasonable notice of the assignment and was under a 
duty to pay over to the plaintiff the amount due to the 
assignor. 7 Moab Nat; 1 Bank. 517 P. 2d at 1022-23. First 
Security attempts to distinguish Moab Nat' 1 Bank from this case 
by pointing out "that the account creditor [sic] was notified by 
telephone that $4,000.00 was to be paid to the assignee. " 
(First Security' s Brief, p. 14. ) Assuming this is a valid 
factual distinction, it is irrelevant to this argument. Moab 
Nat' 1 Bank, as well as other cases cited by both parties, were 
decided under particular facts and circumstances, some of which 
may or may not be applicable to this case. The salient point in 
Moab Nat' 1 Bank is, however, that the test of whether America 
First' s notice was reasonable is to be determined under the 
specific circumstances and facts unique to this case. 
7Although the court does not specifically refer to section 
70A-9-318(3), the statutory notice requirement is incorporated 
into the court' s analysis. 
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In both Bank of Salt Lake and Moab Nat' 1 Bank, the 
Utah Supreme Court found guidance in the additional U. C. C. 
provisions of section 70A-1-201(25)-(26) of the Utah Code. See 
Bank of Salt Lake, 534 P. 2d at 889-90 ("The provisions of 
[section 70A-1-201(25)-(26)] determine the result of this 
appeal."); Moab Nat' 1 Bank. 517 P. 2d at 1022-23 (affirms the 
trial court's reliance on section 70A-1-201(25)-(26) in finding 
the assignment enforceable). 
Section 70A-1-201(25) defines when a person has 
"notice" of a fact. The determination is fact-driven. The 
provision specifically states: 
(a) A person has "notice" of a fact when: 
(i) he has actual knowledge of it; or 
(ii) he has received a notice or 
notification of it; or 
(iii) from all the facts and 
circumstances known to him at the time 
in question he has reason to know that 
it exists. 
(b) A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of 
a fact when he has actual knowledge of it. 
(c) "Discover" or learn" or a word or 
phrase of similar import refers to knowledge 
rather than to reason to know. 
(d) The time and circumstances under which 
a notice or notification may cease to be 
effective are not determined by this title. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(25) (1990). 
Section 70A-1-201(26) defines when a person gives 
notice. The determination depends upon the reasonable 
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expectations of the parties in the ordinary course. The 
provision states: 
(a) A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice 
or notification to another by taking such 
St3P5 AS mjiy ft<? refrgpn?il?ly regytirefl to 
inform the other in ordinary course whether 
or not such other actually comes to know of 
it. 
(b) A person "receives" a notice or 
notification when: 
(i) it comes to his attention; or 
(ii) it is duly delivered at the place 
of business through which the contract was 
made or at any other place held out by him 
as the place for receipt of such 
communi cati ons. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(26) (1990) (emphasis added). 
The decision of what is "reasonable" is not left to 
the arbitrary decision of First Security. The U. C.C. commentary 
states: 
What is "reasonable" is not left to the 
arbitrary decision of the account debtor; if 
there is doubt as to the adequacy either of 
a notification or of proof submitted after 
request, the account debtor may not be safe 
in disregarding it unless he has notified 
the assignee with commercial promptness as 
to the respects in which identification or 
proof is considered defective. 
U. C. C. § 9-318, Official Comment 5 (1990). 
The notice sent by America First to First Security did 
not require magic words to be effective. The only requirement 
was that the notice reasonably demand payment to America First. 
What is reasonable in this case, as in all cases, turns on the 
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specific facts and circumstances. Also relevant to the query of 
what constitutes reasonable notice are the business expectations 
of America First and First Security. 
C. The purpose of requiring the notice to 
demand payment to the assignee is to 
accommodate ordinary business practices in 
indirect-collection situations. 
The express goal of Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code "is to provide a simple and unified structure 
within which the immense variety of present-day secured 
financing transactions can go forward with less cost and with 
greater certainty." See U. C. C. § 9-101, Official Comment 
(1990). This broad goal is the very essence of the Official 
Comment to section 9-318(3)/ which makes clear that the basic 
purpose of the second notice requirement is to accommodate 
ordinary business expectations of the account debtor and the 
seller-assignor in "indirect collection" situations. The 
Official Comment states: 
Subsection (3) clarifies the right of 
an account debtor to make payment to his 
seller-assignor in an "indirect collection" 
situation (comment to § 9-308). So long as 
the assignee permits the assignor to collect 
claims or leaves him in possession of 
chattel paper which does not indicate the 
payment is to be made at some place other 
than the assignor' s place of business, the 
account debtor may pay the assignor even 
though he may know the assignment. In such 
a situation, an assignee who wants to take 
over collections must notify the account 
debtor to make further payments to him. 
U. C. C. § 9-318, Official Comment 3 (1990) (emphasis added). 
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The comments to U. C. C. § 9-308 explain what is meant 
by an "indirect-collection arrangement," 
Arrangements where the chattel paper is 
delivered to the secured party who then 
makes collections, as well as arrangements 
where the debtor, whether or not he is left 
in possession of the paper, makes the 
collections, are both widely used, as are 
known respectively as notification (or 
"direct collection") and non-notification 
(or "indirect collection") arrangements. In 
the automobile field, for example, when a 
car is sold to a consumer buyer under an 
installment purchase agreement and the 
resultant chattel paper is assigned, the 
assignee usually takes possession, the 
obligor is notified of the assignment and is 
directed to make payments to the assignee. 
In the furniture field, for example on the 
other hand, the chattel paper may be left in 
the dealer' s hands or delivered to the 
assignee; in either case the obligor may not 
be notified, and payments are made to the 
dealer-assignor who receives them under a 
duty to remit to his assignee. The 
widespread use of both methods of dealing 
with chattel paper is recognized by the 
provisions of this Article, which permit 
perfection of a chattel paper security 
interest either by filing or by taking 
possession. 
U. C. C. § 9-318, Official Comment 1 (1990). 
Subsection (3) to section 9-318 makes it possible 
therefore in indirect collection situations for the assignor and 
the assignee to agree that the assignor may continue to collect 
its accounts, that the assignee may directly collect the 
accounts, or that the assignee may, at any time it desires, take 
over collection of the accounts. In an indirect-collection 
situation it is imperative that the notice that payment is 
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directed to the assignee must be explicit. Otherwise, the 
account debtor is at risk and will not know if the assignor 
intends to continue to collect the accounts. The stringency of 
the second notice requirement loses steam, however, when there 
is not an indirect collection situation. To hold otherwise is 
to turn a deaf ear to the policies underlying section 70A-9-
318(3). 
First Security states that America First "argued 
before the trial court that notice was sufficient because this 
is not an ' indirect collection7 case. " (First Security' s Brief, 
p. 17. ) Actually, America First argued and still argues that 
notice was sufficient because it was reasonable. Relevant to 
whether the notice was reasonable, however, is the fact that 
this case does not involve an indirect collection situation. 
First Security claims that the Official Comment to 
section 9-318(3) is not supported by case authority. First 
Security7 s claim is erroneous. Leading case authority relies 
heavily on the Official Comment to subsection (3) in determining 
whether notice is reasonable. See e. a. , Warrington v. Dawson. 
798 F. 2d 1533, 1536 (5th Cir. 1986); Great S. Nat7 1 Bank v. 
McCullouah Envtl. Servs. , Inc. , 595 So. 2d 1282, 1287-88 (Miss. 
1992); First Fidelity Bank v. Matthews. 692 P. 2d 1255, 1260 
(Mont. 1984); First Nat71 Bank of Rio Arriba v. Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel. Co. , 91 N. M. 126, 571 P. 2d 118, 120 (1977). 
In First Nat71 Bank of Rio Arriba, a case widely followed for 
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its analysis in determining the notice requirements in § 9-
318(3), the New Mexico Supreme Court relies heavily on the 
Official Comment to § 9-318(3). The New Mexico Supreme Court 
held that language in an assignment that was far less explicit 
and restrictive than the language in the assignment in this case 
gave sufficient notice that payment was to be to the assignee. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court' s liberal reading of the assignment 
language with respect to Article 9 notice requirements was 
premised on the limiting policy of section 9-318(3) to 
accommodate indirect-collection situations. The New Mexico 
Supreme Court explains: 
The code does not require any particular 
language to be used in directing payment to 
the assignee. One purpose for the provision 
requiring notice that "payment is to be made 
to the assignee" is to allow for commercial 
situations where accounts are used as 
collateral to secure a loan repayment. In 
such cases, the borrower often retains the 
right to collect the accounts, and may 
assign these rights of collection only upon 
default by the borrower. Such a transaction 
is referred to as an "indirect collection." 
4 R Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, 
supra. Comment 3 to Section 9-318, and 
Comment 1 to Section 9-308. Subjected to 
such an assignment and indirect collection 
situation, the account debtor could not be 
expected to pay the assignee until he had 
been instructed to do so. 
Id. at 120. First Security attempts to limit Rio Arriba by 
suggesting that the "indirect collection situation" is "only one 
purpose for the requirement that the account debtor be directed 
to pay. " (See First Security' s brief, p. 17. ) First Security 
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is playing with semantics in its attempt to downplay the 
straight-forward policy objective articulated in the Official 
Comment, The Comment itself does not refer to any other purpose 
of subsection (3). Moreover America First is not suggesting 
that the notice provisions of subsection (3) are limited to 
indirect collection situations. Instead/ America First simply 
asserts that a critical consideration in determining whether 
notice is reasonable is whether the facts involve an indirect 
collection situation. 
First Security claims that the case Union Inv. Inc. v. 
Midland-Guardian Co. . 30 Ohio App. 3d 59, 506 N. E. 2d 271 (1986) 
completely refutes the purpose of the notice requirement as 
articulated in the Official Comment to section 9-318(3). The 
Ohio Court of Appeals makes no such sweeping holding. First 
Security draws a broad insupportable conclusion based upon a 
unique factual situation. The stated facts in Union Inv. are 
sparse, but apparently the case did not involve an indirect 
collection situation. The Ohio Court of Appeals determined, 
however, that the assignment language was confusing and 
inadequate because the language "merely 'authorized' payment to 
Union. fl Id. at 275. 8 This case is clearly distinguishable 
from Union Inv. America First' s assignment does not merely 
8First Security places great stock in Union Inv. The Ohio 
Court of Appeals decision, however, is not by any stretch a 
leading case. Not one single case has even cited Union 
Investment for its analysis of section 9-318(3). 
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"authorize" payment. The facts show that the First Security 
understood fully well that payment was directed to the credit 
union upon the default of Renaissance. A demand subject to a 
contingency is completely different from a mere authorization of 
payment. 
The other decisions cited by First Security are not 
controlling either. For instance, in an indirect-collection 
situation in First Trust & Savs. Bank of Glenview v. Skokie 
Fed'1 Savs. & Loan Ass'n. 126 111. App. 3d, 42, 81 111. Dec. 
246, 466 N. E. 2d 1048 (111. App. 1 Dist. 1984), the assignment, 
although acknowledged by the account debtor, merely authorized 
the account debtor to make payments to the assignee. Moreover, 
the assignee acquiesced for roughly 2 1/2 years before taking 
action to enforce its rights under the assignment. The court 
concluded that the acquiescence on the part of the assignee and 
the mere "authorization" in the notice of assignment given to 
the account debtor amounted to an insufficient demand for 
payment. Id. at 1050. 
Given the variance of facts and circumstances that 
range from case to case, it is not surprising that the court in 
Municipal Trust and Sav. Bank stresses the fact-intensive nature 
of the notice requirement in section 9-318(3). Municipal Trust 
and Sav. Bank, 525 N. E. 2d at 258. What constitutes reasonable 
notice must be determined from the notice alone, but in the 
context of the particular facts and circumstances. Id. 
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ILL 
America First's assignment reasonably 
demanded payment under the particular facts and 
circumstances in this case. 
First Security does not dispute any of the trial 
court' s factual findings. The trial court made specific factual 
findings and concluded that America First reasonably notified 
First Security that payment was to be made to America First. 
(Record at 349.) First Security simply argues that the notice 
did not contain the magic word of "payment" or language 
particular enough to satisfy the notice requirements under 
section 70A-9-318(3). First Security makes no effort to place 
the notice in a factual context. Instead, First Security 
requests that this Court determine whether the notice was 
reasonable from the notice alone. 
The facts in this case clearly support the trial 
court' s finding that the notice reasonably demands payment to 
America First. These facts consider the parties' reasonable 
business expectations and the particular acts and statements of 
the parties. The facts are sufficient, and this Court is 
compelled under Pena to accord the trial court broad discretion 
in its applying the facts to the notice requirements of section 
70A-9-318(3). 
A. This case does not involve an indirect 
collection situation. 
This case is not an indirect collection or even a 
direct collection situation. There are no claims to collect. 
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The account in this case involves a savings account, not an 
arrangement that involves the collection of claims. 9 Treating 
the arrangement in this case as an indirect collection situation 
makes no sense. Bootstrapping to the arrangement in this case 
the rule regarding indirect collections does nothing to further 
the policies and purposes underlying section 70A-9-318(3). 
B. First Security had actual knowledge 
that payment was to be directed to America 
Zixai. 
First Security expressly acknowledged that payment was 
to be made to America First, not Renaissance, when it placed a 
hold on the account. The bank knew payment was to be made to 
America First. Actual knowledge of a fact is notice thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(25)(b) (1990); £££ also Gateway Nat' 1 
Bank of Chicago v. Saxe. 40 A. D. 653, 336 N. Y. S. 2d 668 (1972) 
("Since no particular form of notice is required by the Uniform 
Commercial Code and actual knowledge of a fact is notice thereof 
(U. C. C. § 1-201(25), the knowledge of defendant's senior partner 
is imputed to it."). Now in the aftermath of its "oversight," 
First Security attempts to extinguish its previously-recognized 
duty by insisting that the assignment did not, in effect, 
contain the magic words First Security insists are required 
under § 70A-9-318(3). 
9The fact that America First' s rights to the collateral 
ripen only upon default of Renaissance is material only if this 
case involved an indirect collection situation. 
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C. The particular facts and circumstances 
in this case show that the notice was 
reasonable. 
Although each case differs factually, Municipal Trust 
and Savs. Bank poses an analogous factual setting. Like the 
defendant in Municipal Trust and Savs. Bank, First Security 
acknowledged and promised to comply with America First' s 
request- First Security even went one step further and placed a 
hold on the account. Also similar to the defendant in Municipal 
Trust and Savings Bank. First Security never demanded more proof 
of the assignment. The final similarity is that the notice was 
not sent independently by America First; it was co-signed by Don 
Newsom. £££ Municipal Trust and Savs. Bank v. Grant Park 
Community Dist. Number 6. 171 111. App. 289, 121 111. Dec. 449, 
525 N. E. 2d 235, 238 (1988). The assignment did not merely 
"authorize" payment as the parties did in Union Inv. 
The reasonableness of America First' s notice is 
further punctuated by the fact that America First had in its 
possession a savings certificate that indicated that the monies 
in the certificate of deposit would not be released unless upon 
proper presentation. America First reasonably believed that 
First Security would do as it represented it would do on the 
savings certificate. First Security' s action in placing a hold 
on the account also underscores the reasonableness of America 
First' s expectation that the savings certificate meant what it 
said. 
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For the first time in this case First Security now 
argues that the security agreement precludes America First from 
entitlement to the account proceeds until Renaissance defaulted 
on the loan. (First Security7 s brief, pp. 18-19. ) This 
argument reflects the bank/ s further misunderstanding of section 
70A-9-318(3). Under the plain language of section 70A-9-318(3), 
it is immaterial that America First' s rights to the collateral 
ripen only upon default of Renaissance. Subsection (3) 
expressly applies to situations where the "account debtor 
receives notification that the amount due or to become due has 
been assigned . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3) (1990). 
Moreover, First Security' s argument actually further 
evidences the reasonableness of the notice. It would not make 
sense for America First to explicitly demand payment; 
Renaissance was not in default at the time and this was not an 
indirect collection situation. First Security does not dispute 
that it received notice and was instructed by the notice not to 
release the $99,999.00 to Renaissance unless it received from 
America First a written notice of release. 
In an attempt to strap America First with a 
requirement that in no way reflects the reasonable business 
expectations of the parties, First Security hopes to escape the 
consequences of its mistake when it released the hold on the 
assigned account. Its attempt under section 70A-9-318(3) is 
tantamount to forcing a square peg in a round hole. 
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Fortunately, the U. C. C. will not accommodate First Security' s 
endeavor. 
IV. 
The trial court did not err in 
refusing to credit First Security 
for proceeds deposited into 
Renaissance' s account with America First 
First Security argues that America First must be given 
a credit for the alleged $19,096.03 benefit it received from the 
account proceeds. First Security derives the amount of 
$19,096.03 from the difference between the total payoff of the 
Valley Bank loan ($304,243.33) and the portion of the third loan 
available to pay on that loan ($285,187.04). First Security's 
assumption that the $19,096.03 is a red herring; it is based 
upon pure speculation and makes no sense. 
The $19,096.03 directly benefitted Valley Bank, not 
America First. The only possible benefit to America First is 
"the consolidation of collateral." First Security did not 
explain to the trial court, and it does not now explain to this 
Court, how this supposed "consolidation of collateral" gave 
America First a benefit of $19,096.03. The evidence at trial 
shows that at the time of the deposit, Renaissance had 
additional funds, ranging from $20,000.00 to $40,000.00, flowing 
through its account from other major contracts on a weekly 
basis. 
First Security attempts to force the issue by citing 
to Citizens Nat' 1 Bank v. Witt, 367 F. 2d 541 (5th Cir. 1966), 
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the facts of which render the decision wholly inapplicable to 
this case. Citizens Nat/ 1 Bank involved an indirect collection 
situation. The subcontractor had assigned to the bank moneys 
payable under a subcontract and directed the contractor to make 
the checks payable to the subcontractor and the bank. The bank 
brought a claim against the contractor for payments it made to 
the subcontractor alone in breach of the assignment by the 
subcontractor to the bank. The court noted that in determining 
the liability of the contractor to the bank, there were defenses 
available. For example, the court held that where a check 
payable to the subcontractor alone was deposited by it in the 
bank, it can claim no injury because it was not named as a 
payee. Citizens Nat' 1 Bank, 367 F. 2d at 547 ("Since the 
assignment was a security, Stringfellow [the contractor] will 
not be liable to the bank for checks made to West [the 
subcontractor] alone at such time or times, if any there were, 
when West was not indebted to the bank. ") 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not err in holding that America 
First complied with Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3). The trial 
court did not err in refusing to grant First Security a credit 
for proceeds deposited into Renaissance' s account with America 
First. For the foregoing reasons, America First respectfully 
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requests that this Court deny First Security' s appeal. 
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ASSIGNMENT OF SAVINGS CEEgnFICATE 
Vfe are holding as collateral on a Line of Credit Savings Certificate No 
984993 in the Amount of $99f999.00f in the name of Renaissance 
Exchange. Renaissance Exchange Inc. is willing to pledge this 
certificate as collateral on their loan with America First Credit Union. 
Renaissance Exchange, Inc. 
By: ja*s/fc fas,^*^ . f&fi^Jiy 
~% Title 
America First Credit Union is holding the original certificate as 
collateral. We would appreciate your acknowledgement of the 
Assignment
 f also confirming the balance of $99,999.00. This Assignment 
will be in affect until you have received written notice of our release 
of the Assignment. Please acknowledge the Assignment and the balance 
by signing belcw. One copy should be retained in your files. 
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